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Abstract
Arguments have always played a central role within logic and philosophy.
But little attention has been paid to arguments as a distinctive kind of
discourse, with its own semantics and pragmatics. The goal of this essay
is to study the mechanisms by means of which we make arguments in
discourse, starting from the semantics of argument connectives such as
‘therefore’. While some proposals have been made in the literature, they
fail to account for the distinctive anaphoric behavior of ‘therefore’, as
well as for uses of argument connectives in complex arguments, supposi-
tional arguments, arguments with non-declarative conclusions, as well as
arguments with parenthetical remarks. We argue that a comprehensive
account of arguments requires imposing a distinctive tree-like struc-
ture on contexts. We show how to extend our account to accommodate
modal subordination and different flavors of argument connectives.
Keywords: arguments, anaphora, dynamic semantics, therefore, supposition,
modal subordination
1 Introduction
In natural languages, arguments are conventionally associated with particular
grammatical constructions, such as:
(1) a. P1, . . . , Pn. Therefore, C;
b. Suppose P1, . . . , Pn. Then, C.
1
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2 The Dynamics of Argumentative Discourse
These constructions involve words such as ‘therefore’, ‘then’, ‘thus’, ‘hence’,
‘so’, etc. — or argument connectives. While some proposals have been
made about the semantics of ‘therefore’ and related expressions in the recent
literature (Brasoveanu 2007; Pavese 2017, 2021), these proposal focus narrowly
on simple arguments with categorical premises and declarative conclusions.
These proposals fail to account for uses of argument connectives in arguments
with non-declarative conclusions, in suppositional arguments, and in complex
arguments — arguments that contain subarguments. Our primary goal in this
paper is to provide a comprehensive semantics for argument connectives that
captures their uses in argumentative discourses.
Because arguments are made through discourses, it is natural to appeal to
dynamic approaches to meaning in order to model arguments in discourse. Our
analysis will be deeply informed by such approaches — specifically by dynamic
approaches to modals and conditionals (e.g., Veltman 1985, 1996; Kaufmann
2000; Beaver 2001; Brasoveanu 2007; Gillies 2009; Willer 2013; Bittner 2014;
Murray 2014; Starr 2014a,b). As we will see, however, in order to capture the
distinctive dynamics of arguments, we need to enrich our model of contexts
beyond what is typically assumed in dynamic semantics — viz., as bodies of
information (e.g., as a set of worlds), perhaps imbued with some additional
structure (e.g., a probability function, discourse referents, a preference order-
ing, a partition, etc.). The reason is that arguments with multiple suppositions
(as in proof by cases) or suppositions within suppositions (as in conditional
proofs) seem to make use of multiple bodies of information at once. So contexts
need to keep track of several bodies of information, as well as of how these
bodies of information relate to one another within an argument. One upshot
of this project is that the notion of context required to model the dynamics of
arguments has a distinctive tree-like structure — a structure similar to what
has been proposed in SDRT, which however has been developed to account
primarily for pronominal anaphora (Kehler 2002; Asher and Lascarides 2003;
Lascarides and Asher 2007).
Here is the plan going forward. In Section 2, we present some initial data
surrounding argument connectives like ‘therefore’ that we wish to capture.
Having outlined the data, our approach will be incremental. In Section 3, we
introduce a simple dynamic semantics that can model categorical arguments
— i.e., arguments that have categorical, rather than suppositional, premises —
and we show how this simple semantics can be augmented to account for argu-
ments with non-declarative conclusions. In Section 4, we extend this framework
to account for suppositional arguments as well as complex arguments — i.e.,
arguments that contain subarguments. In Section 5, we refine this semantics
further so to capture modal subordination effects in suppositional arguments
as well as different flavors of ‘therefore’. We conclude in Section 6 with some
directions for future research.
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2 The data
2.1 Anaphoric behavior
A central observation to our project is that argument connectives such as
‘therefore’ exhibit an anaphoric behavior (Brasoveanu 2007, p. 296; Webber
2016).1 An anaphoric expression is one whose referent is supplied by an
occurrence of some other antecedent expression (King and Lewis 2018). The
standard diagnostics are (i) anaphors need a linguistic antecedent; (ii) they
can be interpreted relative to different antecedents depending on the context;
and (iii) anaphors can occur in donkey-like sentences.
‘Therefore’ satisfies these main criteria for anaphoricity. First, it needs a
linguistic antecedent, as evinced by the infelicity of the following (said out of
the blue):2
(2) a. ??Therefore/Hence/Thus, we should leave.
b. ??Therefore/Hence/Thus, streets are wet.
c. ??Therefore/Hence/Thus, either it is raining or it is not raining.
Indeed, while it is a familiar observation that epistemic modals such as ‘must’
can also be anaphoric (on arguments, cf. Stone 1994), the anaphoric behavior
of ‘therefore’ is even more explicit than that of ‘must’, in that while ‘therefore’
requires a linguistic antecedent, ‘must’ does not:
(3) a. [Looking at the clock.] We must leave!
b. [Looking out the window at the rain.] The streets must be wet.
c. [The logic instructor says:] It must be that either it is raining or it
is not raining.
The antecedent of ‘therefore’ can be a premise, or a list of premises:
(4) a. There is an on-going epidemic crisis. Therefore, we need vaccines.
b. It is raining. Hence, the streets are wet.
c. I am smelling gas in the kitchen. Thus, there is a gas leak.
It can also be a whole argument, as in the following examples:
(5) Suppose it is raining. Then the streets are wet. Therefore, if it is raining,
the streets are wet.
(6) Maria is either from Turin or from Madrid. Suppose she is from Turin.
Then she is Italian. Suppose instead she is from Madrid. Then she is
Spanish. Therefore, she is either Italian or Spanish.
1Argument connectives have an anaphoric component not only in English (‘there’ in ‘therefore’)
but also in German and Dutch — i.e., ‘des’ in ‘deshalb’ and ‘daar’ in ‘daarom’. Thanks to Mats
Rooth for discussion.
2Neta (2013, pp. 399–406) argues that ‘therefore’ is deictic. However, the need for a linguistic
antecedent suggests instead that argument connectives are better modeled as anaphors. The use of
‘so’ strikingly differs from the use of ‘therefore’ in this regard, in that ‘so’ can also be used without
premises, as in “So, you have arrived!”. This strikes us as meaning something quite different from
‘therefore’, however.
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(7) Suppose there is a largest prime number p. Then p!+1 is larger than p.
But p! + 1 is prime, contradiction. Therefore, there is no largest prime
number.
Like other anaphors, the linguistic antecedent for argument connectives does
not need to be the most immediate one. For example, in (8a), it is natural
to take the antecedent of ‘therefore’ to be the categorical premise that Mark
went to the grocery store and in (8b), the natural antecedent of ‘then’ is the
suppositional premise ‘Suppose Mark went to the grocery store this morning’:
(8) a. Mark went to the grocery store this morning. (Have you been?
They have all sorts of exotic fruit.) Therefore, he has not stayed
all day at home.
b. Suppose Mark went to the grocery store this morning. (Have you
been? They have all sorts of exotic fruit.) Then he bought dragon
fruit.
Like anaphors, it can be ambiguous what the antecedent is. For example, in
(9), there are two possible antecedents for the last sentence.
(9) Either it is raining or it is not. Suppose it is raining. Then you should
take the umbrella. Suppose it is not raining. Then taking the umbrella
will do no harm. Therefore, you should take an umbrella.
a. categorical: you should take an umbrella regardless of whether
it is raining or not.
b. suppositional: you should take an umbrella also assuming it is
not raining.
On the most natural reading — which we will call the categorical reading
— the antecedent is the entire argument from the premise ‘Either it is raining
or it is not’ to ‘Then taking the umbrella will do no harm’. However, there is
another reading — what we will call the suppositional reading — where the
antecedent of the last ‘therefore’ is the subargument ‘Suppose it is not raining.
Then taking the umbrella will do no harm’. On this reading, the last sentence
only expresses a claim about what follows from the supposition that it is not
raining. (This reading can be brought out by continuing (9) with ‘. . . So either
way, you should take an umbrella.’)
Finally, the following are plausible examples of donkey sentences involving
‘therefore’:
(10) a. Whenever one believes a certain view, one has to believe that its
consequences are therefore true.
b. If one derives a contradiction from a claim, one may infer that it
is therefore false.
Taken together, these observations suggest that ‘therefore’ exhibits similar
behavior to anaphors.
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This said, the anaphoric behavior of ‘therefore’ is, in some respects, more
constrained than ordinary pronominal anaphora. Pronouns can anaphorically
depend on very far back antecedents, if they are sufficiently salient; by contrast,
like propositional anaphora more generally (Krifka 2013), it seems to be more
constrained in how far back ‘therefore’ can reach its antecedents and so in the
sort of antecedents it can take. For example, in (11), ‘therefore’ cannot take
‘The wall is wet with paint’ only as an antecedent.3
(11) The wall is wet with paint and it is made of concrete. ??Therefore,
you will stain your shirt if you lean on it.
Moreover, piled up ‘therefore’ can only refer to the immediately precedent
ones. For example, in (12), the last ‘therefore’ cannot select only ‘Paolo is
Italian’ as its antecedent and hence is off when its conclusion is not relevant
to its immediate precedent.
(12) Paolo is Italian. Therefore, he is European. ?Therefore, he speaks
Italian.
While there is more work to be done to sort out what exactly the restrictions
on the anaphoric behavior of ‘therefore’ are, the important observation for our
purposes is that it has anaphoric behavior in the first place.4
2.2 Embedding and projection
A second observation about ‘therefore’ is that it appears to have a restrictive
syntax in its embedding behavior. On one hand, ‘therefore’ can embed under
conjunction as in (13).
(13) It is raining and therefore the streets are wet.
But, for example, it cannot directly embed under disjunction:
(14) There are dark clouds on the horizon. ??Either it is therefore raining
or it is therefore snowing.
Moreover, ‘therefore’ seems to embed under modals but when it does, it priv-
ileges a wide scope reading. Thus, in the examples in (15), the modals are
naturally interpreted as having narrow scope with respect to ‘therefore’:
(15) It’s raining. . .
a. The streets might therefore be wet.
≈ Therefore, the streets might be wet.
b. The streets are probably, therefore, wet.
≈ Therefore, the streets are probably wet.
3Thanks to Mats Rooth for bringing this important point to our attention.
4In being more constrained than pronominal anaphora, the anaphoric behavior of ‘therefore’
resembles null anaphora (Chomsky 1981, p. 191; Chomsky 1982, p. 21; Lust et al 1986, pp. 246–8).
More generally, propositional anaphora seems to be more constrained than pronominal anaphora
in the sort of antecedents that it can take (e.g., Needham 2012; Krifka 2013; Elswyk 2019).
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c. It must be that therefore the streets are wet.
≈ Therefore, the streets must be wet.
The same is true for negation: it seems that even when negation syntacti-
cally scopes over ‘therefore’, it is naturally interpreted as having narrow scope
under ‘therefore’ (as illustrated in (16a)) and that ‘therefore’ cannot easily be
embedded under negation (as illustrated in (16b)).
(16) a. It is not, therefore, raining.
≈ Therefore, it is not raining.
b. ??It is humid outside. It is not the case that therefore the street are
wet.
With that said, we can force modals and negation to take wide scope over
‘therefore’ by embedding the ‘therefore’ in a conjunction.
(17) a. It might be that it is raining and therefore the streets are wet.
b. It is probable that it is raining and therefore the streets are wet.
c. It must be that it is raining and therefore the streets are wet.
d. It is not the case that Mark is a progressive and therefore a
supporter of the Green New Deal.
Yet, although ‘therefore’ can, syntactically, take narrow scope with respect to
modals and negation when it immediately embeds under conjunction, seman-
tically the relation between the antecedent and the consequent can project
out of the embeddings (Neta 2013; Pavese 2017; Stokke 2017; Pavese 2021).
Thus, (17d) has a reading which conveys that Mark’s supporting the Green
New Deal follows from his being a progressive.5 Similarly for these examples:
(18) a. Is Mark a progressive and therefore a supporter of the Green New
Deal?
b. If Mark is a progressive and therefore a supporter of the Green
New Deal, he will not vote for Trump.
c. It might be that Mark is a progressive and therefore a supporter
of the Green New Deal.
Moreover, as famously observed by Grice (1975), the entailment expressed by
‘therefore’ cannot easily targeted by demonstratives or denied, suggesting that
it is not at issue even when used outside of conjunctions. Indeed, in this respect
‘therefore’ strikingly differs from ‘it follows that’:
(19) a. A: Mary is English and therefore brave.
B: #That is false. [where ‘that’ targets the entailment]
5We think that non-projective readings under modals, belief reports, and negation are also
sometimes possible (for some discussion of non-projective readings under negation, see Pavese
2021), and that our proposed analysis can be extended to capture those too. However, because
these embedded uses of ‘therefore’ are not our main focus in this paper, we bracket this big
issue here. We will return to non-projective readings under modals and belief reports briefly in
Section 3.2.
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b. A: Mary is English and it follows from this that she is brave.
B: That is false.
Furthermore, in contrast with what we have observed with ‘therefore’, the
entailment cannot project out of embeddings when it is conveyed by ‘it follows
that’:
(20) a. It is not the case that Mary is English and that it follows from
that that she is brave.
b. Is it the case that Mary English and that it follows from this that
she is brave?
While Grice has argued on these bases that ‘therefore’ is a paradigmatic
example of a conventional implicature, some have argued that the pattern of
projection is actually more constrained than that associated typically with con-
ventional implicatures. While appositives, for example, are widely projective
even when embedded in attitude reports (e.g., ‘Mary believes that June, who is
English, is brave’ conveys that June is English; cf. Potts et al 2005; Mandelkern
2016), with attitude verbs, and perhaps with epistemic modals too, both the
projective and the non-projective reading of ‘therefore’ seem to be available
(e.g., ‘Mary believes that June is English and therefore brave’). Even within
the scope of negation, some hear both a projective and a non-projective read-
ing for ‘therefore’. On the basis of this and other evidence, ‘therefore’ seems
to behave more like a presupposition trigger (cf. Pavese 2021).6
2.3 Non-declarative premises/conclusions
A third observation is that not only declarative sentences but also imperatives
and interrogatives can appear as conclusions of arguments (cf. Parsons 2011,
2013; Charlow 2014; Starr 2020):
(21) a. If May arrives late tonight, you should go to the store. As a matter
of fact, Mary is arriving late. Therefore, go to the store!
b. But seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and
all these things will be added unto you. Therefore do not worry
about tomorrow, for tomorrow will worry about itself. Today has
enough trouble of its own. (Matthew 3:64)
(22) a. The victim was stabbed to death. Therefore, who committed the
murder?
b. Whoever is faithful with very little will also be faithful with much,
and whoever is dishonest with very little will also be dishonest
with much. Therefore, if you have not been faithful with worldly
wealth, who will entrust you with true riches? (Luke 16:11)
6The boundaries between conventional implicatures and presuppositions are notoriously hard
to draw and some have doubts about there being a fruitful distinction here (Karttunen and Peters
1979; Bach 1999). In this paper, we are more concerned with the task of modeling the phenomenon
than with the task of classifying it.
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By contrast, the data is less clear about whether the antecedents of an argu-
ment connective can be imperative or interrogative. For example, the following
discourses sound off:
(23) a. Go to the store. ??Therefore, take the car.
b. Go to the store. ??Therefore, you can’t go see your friends.
(24) a. Have you seen my keys? ??Therefore, where did I put them?
b. Have you seen my keys? ??Therefore, I’ve lost them.
In the light of this data, in our discussion, we will proceed on the assumption
that, while the conclusions of an argument can be non-declarative, the premises
of an argument ought to be declarative.
3 A semantics for categorical arguments
Having examined some data surrounding argument connectives that it is
important for a theory of arguments to capture, we will start from a sim-
ple semantics for categorical arguments inspired by Pavese’s (2017) dynamic
semantics for ‘therefore’. We begin in Section 3.1 with a brief motivation
for this account of ‘therefore’ by noting how it compares with epistemic
‘must’. Then in Section 3.2, we present the dynamic account more formally.
In Section 3.3, we discuss different notions of entailment one could define in
this framework. Finally, in Section 3.4, we show how to extend this account to
cover categorical arguments with non-declarative conclusions.
3.1 Analogies and contrasts between ‘therefore’ and
epistemic modals
As observed by Brasoveanu (2007, pp. 295–6), ‘therefore’ bears a close resem-
blance with modals. First, (25) is very close in meaning to the modalized
conditional (26):
(25) Sarah saw a puppy. Therefore, she petted it.
(26) If Sarah saw a puppy, she (obviously/necessarily/must have) petted it.
provided that we add to (26) the premise (27):
(27) Sarah saw a puppy.
Second, as we have seen in Section 2.1, ‘therefore’ exhibits an anaphoric behav-
ior, similar to that of modals. Third, just like modals can come in different
flavors (causal, logical consequence, practical) (Kratzer 1977, 1981), so can
‘therefore’. In particular, as discourse coherence theorists have emphasized,
‘therefore’ can be used with a causal meaning (cf. Hobbs 1985; Asher 1993;
Bras et al 2001a,b, 2009; Kehler 2002; Asher and Lascarides 2003), as in (28).
(28) a. Mary qualified for the exam. Therefore, she could enroll.
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b. A lighted cigarette was carelessly dropped into the hay. Therefore,
the hay was caught on fire.
And arguments can also have practical flavor (cf. Brasoveanu 2007, p. 279), as
in (29).
(29) We cannot put the face of a person on a stamp unless said person is
deceased. My suggestion, therefore, is that you drop dead (attributed
to J. Edward Day; letter, never mailed, to a petitioner who wanted
himself portrayed on a postage stamp).
While this analogy between ‘therefore’ and modals is important and
instructive, one important difference is worth highlighting. As we have seen
in Section 2.2, ‘therefore’ exhibits a projective behavior. By contrast, ‘must’
does not have the same projective behavior. None of (30a)–(30d) conveys that
Mark’s supporting the Green New Deal follows in any way from him being a
progressive:
(30) a. It is not the case that Mark is a progressive and must support
the Green New Deal.
b. Is Mark a progressive and must support the Green New Deal?
c. If Mark is a progressive and must support the Green New Deal,
he will not vote for Trump.
d. It might be that Mark is a progressive and must support the
Green New Deal.
So, while a semantics for ‘therefore’ should aim at capturing the analogy
with modals observed by Brasoveanu (2007), it also should account for this
difference in projective behavior.
3.2 Dynamic semantics for ‘therefore’
3.2.1 Syntax
We introduce a simple language containing the standard Booleans, epistemic
‘must’ and ‘might’, and the argument connective ∴. We will formalize all con-
clusion connectives — ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘then’, etc. — using ∴. While there
are some notable differences between these connectives (see Section 6), we set
them aside here.
Definition 1 (Simple Syntax)
φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∧ ∴φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ) | ♦φ | φ
σ ::= φ | ∴φ
This syntax only allows ∴ to occur within certain embedded contexts, specifi-
cally within conjunction, or within other operators embedding conjunctions:
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p ∧ ∴q
¬(p ∧ ∴q), etc.
This restrictive syntax reflects the fact that, as we have seen in Section 2.2,
‘therefore’ cannot directly embed under any operator — e.g., it cannot directly
embed under disjunction, as in (14); and it is naturally interpreted as having
wide scope over epistemic modals and negation, as narrow-scope readings,
when possible, are rather forced (cf. (15a)–(15c); ((16a)–(16b)).
It would of course be desirable to have some explanation for this restrictive
syntax rather than just to stipulate it. One possible explanation (for at least
some of this restricted syntactic distribution) is that drawing a conclusion
is a performative speech act. If ‘therefore’ encodes a performative element,
we should expect it to behave similarly to performatives such as ‘I hereby
conclude’. And performatives such as ‘I hereby conclude’ are indeed similar
to ‘therefore’ in their restricted syntactic distribution.7 For one thing, they
typically do not embed under disjunction but, like ‘therefore’, they can embed
under conjunction (Krifka 2014):
(31) a. There are dark clouds on the horizon. ?I hereby conclude that it
is raining, or I hereby conclude that it is not raining.
b. There are dark clouds on the horizon and I hereby conclude that
it is raining.
Similar considerations might explain the observation that ‘therefore’ is nat-
urally interpreted as taking wide scope over epistemic modals and negation.
After all, sentences in which ‘I hereby conclude’ is embedded under epistemic
modals or negation are also rather forced:8
(32) a. It is raining. ? It might be that I hereby conclude that the streets
are wet.
b. It is raining. ? It is not the case that I hereby conclude that the
streets are wet.
The assumption that argument connectives such as ‘therefore’ encode a per-
formative element might explain their restricted syntax and so motivates our
syntax as well as the focus of our analysis going forward.9
7We thank a referee for this helpful suggestion.
8One potential difference in this respect is that performatives such as ‘I hereby promise’ and ‘I
hereby conclude’ can be denegated (Searle 1969; Hare 1970) as in (i):
(i) a. I don’t conclude that he is wrong.
b. I don’t promise that I will behave.
By contrast, it is not clear that there is an analogous denegative use for ‘therefore’ under negation.
9Another possible explanation of the fact that ‘therefore’ does not easily embed under nega-
tion might be syntactic: as is well-known, negation creates scope islands (Ross 1984), and so the
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3.2.2 Semantics
We propose a dynamic analysis on which ‘therefore’ works as a particular kind
of test. In dynamic semantics, a test is an expression whose role is to check
that the context satisfies certain constraints as opposed to adding information
to the context.
The simplest examples of dynamic entries for ‘might’ (Veltman 1996),
‘must’ (von Fintel and Gillies 2007), and the conditional (Veltman 1985; Gillies
2010; Starr 2014a) are as follows:
s[♦φ] = {w ∈ s | s[φ] 6= ∅}
s[φ] = {w ∈ s | s[φ] = s}
s[φ→ ψ] = {w ∈ s | s[φ][ψ] = s[φ]}.
Here, s is an information state — i.e., a set of possible worlds. According
to the entries above, ‘might’, ‘must’, and ‘if. . . then’ test whether s satisfies
certain properties. In the case of ‘might’, it tests whether s is consistent with
the prejacent φ. In the case of ‘must’, it tests whether s “supports” φ — i.e.,
whether s[φ] = s. In the case of ‘if φ, then ψ’, it tests whether the result of
updating s with φ supports ψ. In each case, if s passes the test, it leaves s
unchanged; otherwise, it returns the empty set.
The general idea is that ‘therefore’ tests that the current state already
supports the conclusion, similarly to ‘must’. The only difference is that when




s if s[φ] = s
undefined otherwise
This clause models ‘therefore’ in the way presupposition triggers are typically
modeled in dynamic semantics (cf. Beaver 2001).10
This captures the difference in projective behavior between ‘therefore’ and
‘must’. Consider again (17d):
(17d) It is not the case that Mark is a progressive and therefore a supporter
of the Green New Deal.
This sentence’s update effect is only defined when updating with Mark being a
progressive results in a state that supports Mark’s supporting the Green New
Deal. On a standard dynamic treatment for negation, it takes the complement
antecedent of ‘therefore’ ought to occur within the island for ‘therefore’ to be anaphorically depen-
dent on it. This might explain why ¬(φ ∧ ∴ψ) is grammatical whereas ¬(∴φ ∧ ψ) is not. Thanks
go to a helpful referee for this suggestion.
10Indeed, this entry for ∴ is exactly like the entry Beaver (2001, pp. 156–162) assigns to the
presuppositional operator δ. Like our ∴, δ returns the context if it supports its prejacent, else it
returns an undefined value. The differences between δ and ∴ will become clear in the next section,
where we tackle how to model the anaphoric behavior of ‘therefore’.
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of the result of updating with the prejacent:
s[¬φ] = s− s[φ].
Hence, if ‘therefore’ returned the empty set as the result of a failed test, then
the result of negating it would be defined as well:
s[¬(ψ ∧ ∴φ)] = s− s[ψ][∴φ] = s− ∅ = s.
By contrast, if ‘therefore’ returns an undefined value as the result of a failed
test, then the result of negating it is also undefined: the complement of an
undefined value is undefined. And if we want to allow the content to project,
the value of a failed test must be undefined.
Thus, we can give a full statement of the update effects of sentences on
information states as follows.
Definition 2 (Simple Dynamic Semantics) Where s ⊆W is an information state:
s[p] = {w ∈ s | w(p) = 1}
s[¬φ] = s− s[φ]
s[φ ∧ ψ] = s[φ][ψ]
s[φ ∨ ψ] = s[φ] ∪ s[ψ]
s[φ] = {w ∈ s | s[φ] = s}
s[♦φ] = {w ∈ s | s[φ] 6= ∅}
s[φ→ ψ] = {w ∈ s | s[φ][ψ] = s[φ]}
s[∴φ] =
{
s if s[φ] = s
undefined otherwise
On this semantics, ‘therefore’ is a test.11 As such, it does not add informa-
tion to the context. This seems the desired analysis to us: taking ‘therefore’
to be informative would not quite capture the functional role that we think is
associated with ‘therefore’. Conceptually, we take the function of ‘therefore’ to
be to highlight information that is already available, as it happens in proofs. If
11One potential objection to this semantics for ‘therefore’ is that because it treats ‘therefore’
as a test with the same strength as von Fintel and Gillies’s (2007) ‘must’, it predicts that adding
‘must’ in a conclusion with ‘therefore’ should be redundant. But intuitively, that is not the case;
e.g., in (i), ‘must’ is nonredundant:
(i) Mark owns a Bentley. Therefore, he must be rich.
Following Lassiter (2016) and Del Pinal and Waldon (2019) (and against von Fintel and Gillies
(2007) and von Fintel and Gillies (2010)), we think it is far from obvious that ‘must’ is as strong
as ‘therefore’. Regardless of this thorny issue, the same objection would apply to test semantics
for conditionals (Veltman 1985; Gillies 2009; Starr 2014a), as e.g., the ‘must’ in “If Mark owns
a Bentley, then he must be rich” also seems nonredundant. For a plausible account of what (a
strong) ‘must’ adds that is compatible with our approach, see Mandelkern 2019.
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‘therefore’ were to add information to the context, its role of highlighting conse-
quences of the current context would be lost. While treating ‘therefore’ as a sui
generis test accounts for this intuition, treating ‘therefore’ as an informative
update does not. Furthermore, we want to distinguish adding premises from
drawing a conclusion. If we were to think of ‘therefore’ as informative, we would
miss out on the difference between categorical assertions and conclusions.
This is not to say that ‘therefore’ can never be informative. Although this
theory of ‘therefore’, like dynamic theories of ‘might’ and ‘must’, does not treat
sentences of the form ‘Therefore φ’ as informative, one can adopt solutions
that have been made available elsewhere to capture informative uses of ‘there-
fore’. For example, Willer (2013) accounts for informative uses of ‘might’ by
modeling information states not as sets of worlds but as sets of sets of worlds;
updating an information state with ♦φ then amounts to removing all sets of
worlds that do not leave open φ. Similarly, one could model informative uses
of ∴φ by treating information states as sets of sets of worlds and then stipulate
that ∴φ removes all sets of worlds that do not support φ. Another option is
to explain informative uses of ‘therefore’ in terms of repair mechanisms, such
as presupposition accommodation (e.g., Stalnaker 1973; Lewis 1979; Beaver
1999; von Fintel 2008). So, while we do not take informative uses of ‘therefore’
to be paradigmatic, there are several resources at our disposal to model them.
Example 3 (Embedding Under Negation) Consider (17d) again. This sentence has the
form ¬(p∧∴gnd). Intuitively, (17d) conveys that Mark’s supporting the Green New
Deal follows from his being progressive. Indeed, this is exactly what our semantics
predicts. The update effect of ¬(p ∧ ∴gnd) on a state s is as follows:




s− s[p] if s[p][gnd] = s[p]
undefined otherwise
This shows that the entailment projects out of negation in such a way that the
sentence is felicitous only if Mark’s supporting the Green New Deal follows from his
being progressive.12
3.3 Entailment
In dynamic semantics, there are generally at least two notions of entailment one
can define: static and dynamic. The choice between them amounts to whether
we only require the conclusion to be supported on states that already support
12Similarly, as we have seen, ∴ can project out of epistemic modals and our test semantics can
easily be extended to capture those projective readings. Some speakers report the availability of
a non-projective reading of ‘therefore’ under ‘might’. We could complicate the current system to
allow for ‘therefore’ to embed under epistemic modals and by introducing an accessibility for ‘♦’
(cf. Goldstein 2019). Then we could model the different readings as testing different accessibility
sets. Indeed, this general strategy would also enable us to capture non-projective readings of
‘therefore’ under belief reports (Section 2.2, footnote 5). However, here we set this complexity
aside and for simplicity, we will stick with our simple system without accessibility relations in
what follows.
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the premises (static) or on any state updated with the premises (dynamic).
We can state these notions more formally as follows:13
Definition 4 (Static Entailment, s) φ1, . . . , φn s ψ iff for all information states
s, if s[φi] = s for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then s[ψ] = s.
Definition 5 (Dynamic Entailment, d) φ1, . . . , φn d ψ iff for all information
states s, if s[φ1] · · · [φn] is defined, then s[φ1] · · · [φn][ψ] = s[φ1] · · · [φn].
The difference comes out clearly when looking at epistemic modals. For exam-
ple, ♦φ,¬φ s ⊥, since if s[♦φ] = s, then s[¬φ] 6= s. By contrast, ♦φ,¬φ 2d ⊥.
For example, if s contains some p-worlds and some ¬p-worlds, then s[♦p] = s
and so s[♦p][¬p] = s[¬p] 6= ∅.
Dynamic entailment also differs from static entailment in its structural
properties. For example, while ♦φ,¬φ 2d ⊥, we do have ¬φ,♦φ d ⊥. Thus,
dynamic entailment is noncommutative (cf. Veltman 1996; Starr 2014a). More-
over, dynamic entailment is nonmonotonic: while ♦φ d ♦φ, still ♦φ,¬φ 2d
♦φ.
These two notions of entailment capture two different senses of validity
that are important for different theoretical purposes. Static entailment seems
to best capture a notion of validity for inferences “taken abstractly” — i.e.,
independent of any specific discourse. Dynamic entailment, by contrast, seems
to capture a notion of validity within a discourse. On the whole, the dynamic
notion seems more appropriate for modeling inferences with argument con-
nectives such as ‘therefore’. For one thing, static entailment is commutative
whereas dynamic entailment is not. Yet the effect of ‘therefore’ on arguments
seems crucially order-sensitive: φ, ∴ψ should not, intuitively, have the same
consequences as ∴ψ, φ. Moreover, as we have seen, the primary function of
argument connectives like ‘therefore’ is inherently dynamic. It is unclear (at
least conceptually) what it is to consider a sentence of the form ∴φ as a premise
“taken abstractly”.
With that said, one must be careful when attempting to understand what
dynamic entailment captures. For example, the following is dynamically valid:
φ ∧ ∴ψ d ∴ψ ∧ φ.
While this might seem counterintuitive at first, it is not surprising given
the notion of validity that dynamic entailment is designed to capture, viz.,
discourse validity. Thus, the following argument as a discourse does seem valid.
13We could have written Definition 5 to say “if s[φ1] · · · [φn][ψ] is defined. . . ” instead. This
would be to essentially adopt a Strawson-notion of entailment, which differs from the standard
notions of validity in that it requires (as a premise) that the presuppositions of the premises
and conclusion are satisfied (von Fintel 2001). However, as an anonymous referee points out, this
would yield bad results for the logic of ‘therefore’. In particular, it would entail that any argument
with a conclusion of the form ∴φ is valid. For this reason, we stick with the “standard” notion of
validity, which just requires the presuppositions of the premises be satisfied.
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(33) It’s raining and therefore the streets are wet. Therefore the streets are
wet and it is raining.
Though repetitive, this is essentially an argument that involves repeating
the premises in the conclusion. Thus, the ‘therefore’ in the conclusion is not
expressing the claim that ‘It’s raining’ follows from ‘The streets are wet’
outright, but rather that it follows given what’s been said in the discourse
already.
Still, we submit that there does seem to be a sense in which inferences like
φ ∧ ∴ψ  ∴ψ ∧ φ are bad. We can capture what is wrong with this inference
using a third notion of entailment, intermediate between the static and the
dynamic ones (cf. Kocurek 2018, §1.4):14
Definition 6 (Kinematic Entailment, k) φ1, . . . , φn k ψ iff for all information
states s, if s[φ1] · · · [φn] is defined, then s[φ1] · · · [φn] ⊆ s[ψ].
In effect, kinematic entailment is a way of assessing how strong an update
effect is. On this notion of entailment, φ∧∴ψ does not entail ∴ψ∧φ, since the
update effect of the former requires ψ to be supported upon update with φ,
whereas the discourse effect of the latter requires that ψ is already supported.
So kinematic entailment gives us the resources to articulate the sense in which
such an inference is bad, while preserving the idea that the primary function
of ‘therefore’ is dynamic.
3.4 Arguments with non-declarative conclusions
In this section, we show that our simple semantics for categorical arguments
can be modified to model arguments with non-declarative conclusions (imper-
atives and interrogatives) (cf. Section 2.3). In order to do so, however, we need
to alter our modeling of contexts as information states — as unstructured sets
of worlds — and add some structure to them.
3.4.1 Imperatives
Let us first consider arguments with imperative conclusions (e.g., (21a)–(21b)).
Start with the syntax. In order to add imperatives to our language, we
introduce an imperative operator ‘!’ with the following syntax.
Definition 7 (Imperative Syntax)
φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∧ ∴φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ) | φ | ♦φ
σ ::= φ | ∴φ | !φ | ∴!φ
14As with dynamic entailment, we only require the presuppositions of the premises be satisfied
— that is, we do not say “if s[φ1] · · · [φn] and s[ψ] are defined. . . ”. If we had, that would validate
the inference from φ ∧ ∴ψ to ∴ψ ∧ φ, which is precisely what we are trying to avoid.
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On this simple syntax, ‘therefore’ can only take immediate wide-scope with
respect to the imperative marker. This restriction seems to be borne out, for
even when ‘therefore’ superficially embeds under the imperative marker, the
only reading that seems to be available is the wide-scope reading. For example,
it seems to us that (34a) is equivalent to (34b):
(34) You can be abrasive at times. . .
a. Try, therefore, to be nicer.
b. ≈Therefore, try to be nicer.
The second step is to settle on a semantics for imperatives. While we do
not need to commit to a particular semantics for imperatives, we will show,
as an example, how to adapt our semantics to a dynamic semantics for imper-
atives due to Starr (2020).15 On Starr’s semantics, the general idea is that
imperatives express the speaker’s preference for certain propositions obtain-
ing. So, for example, ‘Mow the lawn’ expresses our preference for the lawn
being mowed by the addressee — for the proposition that the lawn be mowed
by the addressee obtaining. Starr achieves this effect by thinking of contexts
as more structured than mere information states. In particular, contexts are
thought of as sets of preference relations on information states. Updating with
an imperative !φ amounts to extending each preference relation with the pref-
erence that φ obtain rather than not — i.e., the result of updating the field of
a preference relation with φ (in the ordinary sense) is preferable to the result
of updating the field of that relation with ¬φ.
Although Starr’s system is only defined over the Boolean fragment of our
syntax, there is a natural extension to our syntax available. Here are the formal
details.
Definition 8 (Preference States) A preference relation is a set r ⊆ ℘W × ℘W
of pairs of sets of worlds. A preference state is a set R of preference relations.
For each preference relation r, define sr = field(r).
Definition 9 (Dynamic Semantics for Imperatives)
r[p] = {〈s1[p], s2[p]〉 | 〈s1, s2〉 ∈ r & s1[p] 6= ∅}
R[p] = {r[p] | r ∈ R}
R[φ ∧ ψ] = R[φ][ψ]
R[φ ∨ ψ] = R[φ] ∪R[ψ]
R[φ→ ψ] = {r ∈ R | {r}[φ][ψ] = {r}[φ]}
R[φ] = {r ∈ R | {r}[φ] = {r}}
R[♦φ] = {r ∈ R | {r}[φ] 6= ∅}
R[∴φ] =
{
R if R[φ] = R
undefined otherwise
15For another dynamic account of imperatives, see Portner 2004, 2007. For some alternative
accounts, see Lewis 1972; Schwager 2006; Aloni 2007; Kaufmann 2011; Charlow 2014.
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R[!φ] = {r ∪ {〈sr[φ], sr[¬φ]〉} | r ∈ R}
Thus, effectively, the effect of updating with ∴!φ is to test whether φ is
ranked above ¬φ in the current preference state.
R[∴!φ] =
{
R if for each r ∈ R: 〈sr[φ], sr[¬φ]〉 ∈ r
undefined otherwise
This shows that the simple semantics for ‘therefore’ introduced in this section
can easily be augmented to model arguments with imperative conclusions.
3.4.2 Interrogatives
Let’s now turn to arguments with interrogative conclusions (e.g., (22a)–(22b)).
For the sake of simplicity, we will just focus on yes-no interrogatives (though
generalization to wh-interrogatives is straightforward).
Like with imperatives, we will adopt a simplified (albeit restrictive) syntax
for interrogatives. We introduce an interrogative marker ‘?’, which scopes over
propositional modal formulas but under ‘therefore’.
Definition 10 (Interrogative Syntax)
φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∧ ∴φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ) | φ | ♦φ
σ ::= φ | ∴φ | ?φ | ∴?φ.
In order to give the semantics for interrogatives, we can piggyback on recent
dynamic theories, which take the change effect potential of interrogatives to
be that of raising issues. Following Groenendijk et al (2003) and Aloni et al
(2007), we can model this idea by thinking of an information state, not as a set
of possible worlds, but rather as a partition on possible worlds — i.e., as a
set of mutually disjoint but jointly exhaustive sets, or cells. Then the use of
a yes-no interrogative might refine the partition by dividing current cells into
smaller cells. More precisely, let π be our partition on some (nonempty) subset
of W . Updating π with a declarative φ returns the cells in π each updated with
φ, provided that the result of the update is not empty. On the other hand,
updating π with a yes-no interrogative ?φ returns the union of the result of
updating π with φ and the result of updating π with ¬φ. This models the idea
that yes-no interrogatives contribute by refining current partitions.
Definition 11 (Dynamic Semantics for Interrogatives)
π[φ] = {s[φ] | s ∈ π and s[φ] 6= ∅}
π[?φ] = π[φ] ∪ π[¬φ]
π[∴φ] =
{
π if π[φ] = π
undefined otherwise
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The general idea is that when we use ‘therefore’ with an interrogative ?φ, all
we do is to test that the issue raised by ?φ is already represented in the current




π if π[φ] ∪ π[¬φ] = π
undefined otherwise
An advantage of this semantics for ‘therefore’ with interrogatives is that
it is positioned to get different readings that are available for interrogative
conclusions. Sometimes, we use ‘therefore’ with an interrogative when it is
not known yet in the common ground what is a true answer to that issue
raised. So, for example, we might use (22a) in a context that still does not
settle the question who committed the murder. This is an inquisitive use of
the interrogative. This semantics captures this use since it predicts that in this
sort of context, by use of (22a), we are testing that who committed the murder
is still an open issue. By contrast, suppose it is common knowledge that the
only person that would stab the victim was Steve. Then, in this case, the
interrogative in (22a) has the effect of a rhetorical question, which highlights
that the common ground already settles the answer to that question. For in
this case, adding an interrogative would not further refine a partition because
the corresponding issue has been solved.
In conclusion: when stating the simple semantics for categorical arguments,
in Section 3.2, we have taken information states to be simply unstructured sets
of worlds. However, in order to be able to model uses of argument connectives
with non-declarative conclusions in the current framework, all is needed is for
more structure to be imposed on information states, so that now ‘therefore’
can be taken to test whether adding non-declarative as well as declarative
conclusions alter these more structured information states.
4 A semantics for complex arguments
The semantics presented in Section 3 nicely captures uses of ‘therefore’ in
categorical arguments and it can be refined to capture arguments with non-
declarative conclusions. However, it will not be able to model uses of ‘therefore’
in suppositional arguments and in complex arguments where new suppositions
are introduced. So, for example, arguments of the form:
Suppose P. Then, Q. Therefore, if P , then Q
cannot be directly represented in the simple framework, as this framework does
not have the tools to introduce or discharge new suppositions. Notice that we
cannot simply “mimic” such complex arguments using conditionals, since this
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converts conditional proof into a trivial argument:
P → Q, ∴(P → Q).
It is also not straightforward to apply the simple semantics to arguments
that involve parentheticals, such as (8a) and (8b). More generally, the simple
framework does not have the resources to capture the anaphoric relations that
argument connectives such as ‘therefore’ can establish in discourse.
In order to model these complexities, we introduce two main modifications
to the previous framework — one syntactic and one semantic. In short: the
syntactic modification is to think of discourses not as a sequences of sentences,
but as sequences of labeled sentences — which track anaphoric relations in dis-
course. The semantic modification is to think of contexts as having a distinctive
layered structure.
4.1 Discourses and labeled sentences
What is a discourse? At first, one might think the answer is simple: it is
just a sequence of sentences! However, each part of a discourse bears more
information than just the informational content of a sentence.
For example, in a certain part of a discourse, certain suppositions are active
while others are not. But this is not indicated simply by the content of the
sentence itself. Consider again (35) (repeated from (9)):
(35) Either it is raining or not. Suppose it is raining. Then better to take
the umbrella. Suppose it is not raining. Then taking the umbrella will
do no harm. Therefore, you should take the umbrella.
As we have seen, in (35) the final sentence ‘Therefore, you should take the
umbrella’ could either be interpreted categorically (as in (36a)) or supposi-
tionally (as in (36b)). We could more clearly represent the two readings if we
“labeled” the suppositions and ‘therefore’ accordingly:
(36) a. categorical: Either it is raining or not. Suppose1 it’s raining.
Then1 better to take the umbrella. Suppose2 it is not raining.
Then2 taking the umbrella will do no harm. Therefore, you should
take the umbrella.
b. suppositional: Either it is raining or not. Suppose1 it’s raining.
Then1 better to take the umbrella. Suppose2 it is not raining.
Then2 taking the umbrella will do no harm. Therefore2, you
should take the umbrella.
By themselves, however, the final sentence does not carry that information: it
is only as part of a bigger discourse that it is possible to disambiguate these
two different readings. This suggests when we interpret a discourse, each part
of the discourse needs to represent which suppositions are active.
Springer Nature 2021 LATEX template
20 The Dynamics of Argumentative Discourse
In addition to keeping track of which suppositions are active, we also want
to be able to keep track of which suppositions are in the scope of which
suppositions. For example, consider (37):
(37) Paolo is either from Bologna or from New York. Suppose1, on the one
hand, that he is from Bologna. Then1, either he did his PhD in Bologna
or he did it in the US. Suppose1.1 Paolo did his PhD in Bologna.
Then1.1, he studied Umberto Eco’s work. Suppose1.2 instead Paolo
did his PhD in the US. Then1.2, he must have studied philosophy of
language. Therefore1, Paolo either studied semiotics or philosophy of
language. Now, on the other hand, suppose2 Paolo is from New York.
Then2, he did his PhD in the US. Therefore2, he studied philosophy
of language. Either way, therefore, Paolo studied either semiotics or
philosophy of language.
Here, we indicate that a supposition is in the scope of another with a decimal
point. Thus, ‘Suppose1.1 Paolo did his PhD in Bologna’ indicates that this
supposition is in the scope of the first supposition —i.e., ‘Suppose1, on the one
hand, that he is from Bologna.’
Moreover, the use of labels allows us to represent parenthetical remarks,
which break out of the scope of a supposition, as in (38):
(38) Suppose1 Mark went to the grocery store this morning. (Have you
been? They have all sorts of exotic fruit.) Then1 he bought some
dragon fruit. Therefore1, he can make an exotic fruit salad.
The fact that the parenthetical remark does not have the label ‘1’ indicates
that it is not in the scope of the supposition that Mark went to the grocery
store.
To model this formally, we will make two modifications to the syntax. First,
we will add a supposition operator ‘+’ to the language. Thus, our new syntax
for sentences will be given as follows:
Definition 12 (Syntax for Complex Arguments)
φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∧ ∴φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ) | φ | ♦φ
σ ::= φ | ∴φ | +φ | ∴+ φ.
This syntax utilizes the same simplifying assumptions we made about the syn-
tax of imperatives — which makes sense given that ‘suppose’ is an imperative.
In particular, observe that we assume ‘suppose’ always scopes under argument
connectives such as ‘therefore’. This syntax captures the observation that (39a)
and (39b) sound equivalent.
(39) a. It might be raining. Therefore, suppose it is. . . .
b. It might be raining. Suppose, therefore, it is.
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Second, we will think of a discourse as a sequence of what we will call
labeled sentences.
Definition 13 (Labeled Sentence) A labeled sentence is a pair of the form 〈n, φ〉,
which we write as n : φ for short. Here, n is a label, which is a sequence of pos-
itive integers (where, for shorthand, we write 〈n1, n2, . . . , nk〉 in decimal form as
n1.n2. · · · .nk) that represents which suppositions are active, and φ is a sentence (in
the sense of Definition 12). Throughout, we use “0” to stand for the empty tuple 〈〉.
Intuitively, sentences with the label 0 are asserted at the categorical level, whereas
all other labeled sentences fall within the scope of some supposition.
We can represent discourses in a more intuitive format similar to Fitch proofs.
Example 14 (Proof by Cases) We can roughly formalize (35) as the following sequence
of labeled sentences:
0 : (r ∨ ¬r), 0: + r, 1: ∴u, 0: + ¬r, 2: ∴u, 0: ∴u







Example 15 (Nested suppositions) We can formalize (37) as follows:
0 : (b ∨ n), 0: + b, 1: ∴(phdb ∨ phdu), 1: + phdb, 1.1: ∴u, 1: + phdu
1.2: ∴pl, 1: ∴(s ∨ pl), 0: + n, 2: ∴phdu, 2: ∴pl, 0: ∴(s ∨ pl)
The structure of this discourse is much easier to see in a Fitch-like representation:
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Example 16 (Parentheticals) We can formalize (38) as follows:
0 : +m, 0: e, 1: ∴d, 1: ∴f
In the Fitch-like representation, parentheticals can be represented as temporary
breaks within subproofs. (This is one major disanalogy between our representation






Some general remarks about this syntax are in order. A full syntax of discourses
would provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on discourses to be
well-formed. Here, we have fallen short of giving a full set of such conditions.
Overall, we take this flexibility of our system to be a virtue, since our aim
here is to give a very general framework for interpreting the semantic effects
of ‘therefore’ that can be further amended or constrained to accommodate a
wide array of empirical hypotheses about which discourses are well-formed.
However, we do submit that it would be natural to impose at least some con-
straints on acceptable discourses as a way of explaining some of the anaphoric
behavior from Section 2.1. Below, we give a few examples of constraints that
we find fairly plausible.
Understanding discourses in terms of labeled sentences enables to track
anaphoric relations that ‘therefore’ establishes in discourse. However, as we
have seen (Section 2.1), an important reason for thinking that ‘therefore’ is an
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anaphoric expression is that ‘therefore’ needs an antecedent. It might seem as
if nothing in the current syntax reflects this feature of ‘therefore’. However, we
can capture this anaphoric aspect of ‘therefore’ by imposing some additional
constraints on the current syntax. One constraint is that the first labeled
sentence of a discourse cannot be of the form 0: ∴φ. So, (40) is not a proper
discourse:
(40) ??Therefore, we should leave.
Furthermore, a labeled sentence of the form n : ∴φ (where n 6= 0) cannot occur
unless there is a supposition prior to it that introduces the label n into the
discourse. This is parallel to the constraint that an anaphoric expression cannot
have an index that does not appear before. In this sense, in this framework,
the anaphoricity of ‘therefore’ is captured by the structure of discourses as laid
down above together with plausible additional constraints on this discourse
structure.
Another constraint on the structure of discourses might be that supposi-
tions cannot be “idle” — i.e., introduced without a consequent (or without
a discourse whose first element contains its label as an initial segment). This
rules out, e.g., discourses of the form n : + φ, n : + ψ, where the supposition
φ is introduced but not used. Thus, a sequence of suppositions must be inter-
preted as introducing additional levels. To illustrate, sequences of suppositions
like (41) sound marked since the second supposition is interpreted in the scope
of the first (as in (41a)) rather than as a separate supposition (as in (41b)).
(41) Suppose physicalism is true. ??Suppose physicalism is false. . .
a. Suppose1 physicalism is true. Suppose1.1 physicalism is false. . .
b. Suppose1 physicalism is true. Suppose2 physicalism is false. . .
Because the second supposition is interpreted within the scope of the first, as
in (41a), and cannot be interpreted as in (41b), we have explained why (41) is
infelicitous.
A final constraint we will mention is a prohibition on “crisscrossing”
labels (cf. the “right frontier constraint” in SDRT). Essentially, this means
that within a suppositional environment, we cannot refer back to other sup-
positions on the same level. This rules out, e.g., discourses of the form:
1: φ1, . . . , 2: φ2, . . . , 1: ∴ψ. For example, consider (42):
(42) Either it is raining or not. Suppose it is raining. Then it is wet outside.
Suppose it is not raining. Then taking an umbrella would be a hassle.
??Therefore, you should take the umbrella.
This argument seems bad no matter how you parse it. However, if ‘Therefore,
you should take an umbrella’ is interpreted in the scope of the first supposition
(that it is raining), then the argument should be fine. This shows that the last
sentence cannot have the same label as the first supposition: it must either be
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interpreted in the scope of the second supposition (that it is not raining) or
outside the scope of any supposition.
4.2 Contexts as labeled trees
After introducing labeled sentences, we now turn to the semantic innovation:
we propose modeling contexts not as single information states, but rather
as labeled trees of information states — i.e., trees where each node is given
its own label. Labeled trees allow us to track multiple suppositions, nested
suppositions, and anaphoric relations.16
Definition 17 (Context) A context is a partial function c : (N+)<ω → ℘W from
labels (i.e., sequences of positive integers) to information states. For shorthand, where
n is a label (i.e., a sequence of numbers), we write cn in place of c(n). Intuitively
a context is a whole tree, the nodes of which are information states. We use all the
standard ancestral terms (‘parent’, ‘child’, ‘descendent’, and so on) that are used in
talking about trees. In addition, we call the value of a context at the empty sequence
0 its categorical state. We call the value of a context at a non-empty sequence
a suppositional state. Following our earlier convention, the categorical state is
denoted by c0. We will assume every context c for an ordinary conversation has the
following features (so that c really is a labeled tree):
(1) 0 ∈ dom(c)
(2) if 〈n1, . . . , nk+1〉 ∈ dom(c), then 〈n1, . . . , nk〉 ∈ dom(c).
The first constraint just says the categorical state (which is the root of the tree)
is always defined. The second constraint says, in effect, that a suppositional state
is defined only when its parent state is defined. This rules out the possibility of
“disconnected” segments of a branch.
While the meaning of a sentence is taken to be its update effect on infor-
mation states (i.e., a function from information states to information states),
we take the meaning of a discourse to be its update effect on a context (i.e.,
a function from contexts to contexts). Thus, in order to define the meaning
of a discourse, we need to specify (a) how a sentence updates an information
state, and (b) which information state a sentence in a discourse updates. To
address (a), we will assume sentences update information states as in Section 3.
To address (b), we make use of our definition of a discourse as a sequence of
16Our approach differs from Kaufmann’s (2000) stack system in key respects. First, stacks of
information states are linear whereas labeled trees include branching structure. This allows us to
more perspicuously represent arguments involving multiple suppositions, such as proof by cases.
Second, Kaufmann’s framework does not allow one to temporarily exit a supposition, update the
bottom of a stack, and then return to that supposition. This is precisely what is needed to model
parentheticals, and labeled trees provide this ability. Finally, as we observe in the main text,
we want to distinguish adding premises from drawing a conclusion from some premises. This
distinction is blurred in Kaufmann’s system. Though Kaufmann does not have a semantics for
‘therefore’, he does provide a semantics for ‘then’, but one that adds information to the stack
rather than tests it. When Kaufmann’s ‘then’ occurs under categorical premises, Kaufmann’s
system treats ‘then’ as adding information to the bottom of the stack, just like the categorical
premises do. We have already noticed that taking ‘therefore’ (or ‘then’) to be informative in this
way does not quite capture its functional role (3.2).
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labeled sentences to tell us which information state to update at a given point
in the discourse. The basic idea is simple: in effect, n : φ will tell us to update
cn with φ. However, when we introduce a new supposition in a discourse, we
do not simply update the current information state with that supposition —
after all, suppositions are not just assertions. Rather, we create a new informa-
tion state updated with that supposition so that subsequent updates concern
this new state as opposed to (say) the categorical state.
To do this, we need to give a rule for how a supposition creates a new infor-
mation state. The general idea is that a new supposition effectively copies the
information state of its parent and then updates that state with the supposi-
tion. Because ‘suppose’ does not embed under Booleans and modals, we take
it to be an operator that works at the discourse level rather than at the sen-
tential level. Its role at the discourse level is to introduce a new suppositional
state — so if we think of contexts as labeled trees, it maps a labeled tree into
a new one with a new branching node.
We can make these ideas more precise as follows.
Definition 18 (Adding Information) Where n and k are labels, we write n v k
just in case n is an initial segment of k (i.e., either k = n or k is “above” n in the
labeled tree). Where c is a context, let c ↑n φ be the result of removing the worlds
in (cn − cn[φ]) from ck for each k ∈ dom(c) such that k w n (where cn[φ] is defined
as in Definition 2).
In words, c ↑n φ updates cn and all information states “above” cn in the tree
with φ. This allows the information added at a categorical state to percolate
up to the following suppositional states. And so it will allow us to capture
the idea that parentheticals introduce information at lower levels to which
suppositions have then access.
Definition 19 (Introducing New Suppositions) Where n = n1. . . . .nk is a label, let
n+ = n1. . . . .nk.m where m is the first number such that n1. . . . .nk.m /∈ dom(c)
(that is, n+ is the first extension of n that has not been assigned an information
state by c). Let c⊕n φ be just like c except that we define cn+ = cn[φ].
In words, c⊕n φ is the result of extending c with an additional suppositional
state that is copied from cn and then updated with φ.
Definition 20 (Dynamic Semantics for Complex Arguments) Where φ does not
contain ∴ or +:
c[n : φ] =
{
c ↑n φ if cn is defined
undefined otherwise
c[n : ∴φ] =
{
c[n : φ] if cn is defined and c[n : φ]n = cn
undefined otherwise
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c[n : + φ] =
{
c⊕n φ if cn is defined
undefined otherwise
The update effect of ∴ + φ is derived from the update effects for ∴ and +
compositionally.
c[n : ∴+ φ] =
{




c⊕n φ if cn is defined
undefined otherwise
Let’s unpack these update clauses. For illustration, consider the case where
n = 0. If φ does not contain + or ∴, then updating c with n : φ is the result of
updating c0, as well as any suppositional states that have been defined, with
φ (or, more precisely, the information contained in c0[φ]). If n 6= 0, then the
update effect is the same, except we only update information states above cn.
The fact that update “percolates up” a context is what allows us to account
for the effects of parentheticals. Recall (38). Here, the parenthetical adds infor-
mation to the categorical state (to the state antecedent to the ‘Suppose Mark
went. . . ’). But it also adds information to the suppositional state created by
the supposition that Mark went to the grocery store this morning. Else, the
argument would not necessarily be a good one. This is captured by our update
clause: when we update c with 0: e (where e stands for ‘The grocery store has
all sorts of exotic fruit’), we remove all ¬e-worlds from c0 as well as from any
suppositional state that has been defined.
If φ is of the form +ψ, then updating c with n : +ψ amounts to (i) checking
whether cn is defined, and (ii) adding a suppositional state above cn that is the
result of updating cn with ψ. Notice that updating with n : +φ does not affect
cn: that information state is left untouched, which is precisely what we want.
There is some question as to whether + should carry an epistemic possibil-
ity presupposition — that is, whether we should require c[n : φ]n 6= ∅ in order
for c[n : +φ] to be defined. On the one hand, there is some linguistic evidence
to suggest that pSuppose φq presupposes the epistemic possibility of φ.17 For
example, the following discourse sounds strange (at least out of the blue):
(43) It is not raining. ??Suppose it is raining. . .
However, discourses containing reductio reasoning do not fit this pattern. For
example, the following discourse sounds perfect:18
17This is in line with the general idea, prominent in the literature about indicative conditionals,
that antecedents presuppose that the current context is compatible with them (Stalnaker 1976;
Gillies 2009; Starr 2014a,b).
18In dynamic semantics, it is often assumed that reducing a context to the empty set results in
a “context crash”. But in reductio reasoning, reducing a suppositional information state to the
empty set does not necessarily result in a context crash — in fact, it is precisely what is needed!
We can reconcile these two points in the following manner: context crash occurs when either the
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(44) There is no largest prime number. For suppose there is. . .
The reductio example suggests that ‘suppose’ does not carry an epistemic
presupposition after all. Our semantic clauses for + reflects this.
Finally, if φ is of the form ∴ψ, then updating c with n : ∴ψ amounts to
checking whether (i) cn is defined, and (ii) cn supports ψ (or, more precisely,
whether the result of updating c with n : ψ does not change the information
state assigned to n). If c passes this test, then we continue to update c with
n : ψ. This ensures, e.g., that n : ∴ + ψ adds a suppositional state with the
supposition ψ (as opposed to merely checking that adding that state would
not crash the context, which is what would happen if the update clause simply
left c in tact).
4.3 Examples
To illustrate the semantics for discourses just introduced, let us walk through
two examples.
Example 21 (Proof by Cases) Consider again (35). The effect of updating a context
c with this discourse is calculated as follows (throughout, let c0 = s):
• First, we update the categorical state s with the trivial disjunction r ∨ ¬r. So
our context remains unchanged.
s0
• Next, 0 : + r assigns s[r] to the label 0+ = 1 (after checking that c0 is defined,
which it clearly is).
s0
s[r]1
• Then 1: ∴u tests s[r][u] = s[r]. If it passes, it leaves the context unchanged;
otherwise, the resulting context is undefined.
• Assuming s[r] passes the test, 0 : + ¬r assigns s[¬r] to the label 0+ = 2 (now
that c1 is defined).
s0
s[r]1 s[¬r]2
• Then 2: ∴u tests s[¬r][u] = s[¬r]. If it passes, it leaves the context unchanged;
otherwise, the resulting context is undefined.
context is rendered undefined (e.g., because it fails a presuppositional test) or when the categorical
state is reduced to the empty set (since that would be to rule out any world as being the actual
world).
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• Assuming s[¬r] passes the test, 0 : ∴u tests s[u] = s. Since s[r] and s[¬r] have
passed this test, s will, too. So our final context is:
s0
s[r]1 s[¬r]2
An example like (37) can be treated similarly. The only difference is that, with nested
suppositions, there will be further branching at the leaves of the tree.
Example 22 (Parentheticals) Again, the goal is for parentheticals to add information
to a “lower” information state and to have that information percolate “up”. Indeed,
our semantics achieves this. Consider (38) again. The update effect on a context c
with this discourse is as follows (with c0 = s):
• 0: +m maps 0+ = 1 to s[m].
s0
s[m]1




• 1: ∴d tests s[m][e][d] = s[m][e]. Likewise for 1 : ∴f .
Note, as it stands, we do not assume that parentheticals must always go all
the way down to the categorical state. Often, this is the case but there are dis-
courses where a parenthetical is naturally interpreted as adding information to a
suppositional state. For example:
(45) Fluffy is either a cat or dog. Suppose she is a cat. Suppose further she is a
Persian cat. (Arguably, she is either a Persian or a Birman.) . . .
With that said, if we assume that parentheticals always go down to the categorical
state, we could in principle model the effects of parentheticals by adding a sentential
operator. That is, we could introduce an operator LφM with the following update
clause:
c[n : LφM] = c[0 : φ].
4.4 Entailment for discourses
Defining entailment in this framework is trickier than it might at first appear.
To illustrate the complications, let us first consider dynamic entailment. As
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a first pass, we might try to define entailment as a relation between labeled
sentences along the following lines:
Definition 23 (Labeled Dynamic Entailment) n1 : φ1, . . . , nk : φk d m : ψ iff
for all c, if c[n1 : φ1] · · · [nk : φk]m is defined, then c[n1 : φ1] · · · [nk : φk][m : ψ]m =
c[n1 : φ1] · · · [nk : φk]m.
One issue with this, however, is that defining entailment a relation between
labeled sentences makes it difficult to adequately represent inference patterns
that involve introducing new labels, such as conditional proof. For example,
the following is not necessarily an instance of conditional proof:
0 : + φ, 1: ∴ψ  0: ∴(φ→ ψ)
For all we know, the label 1 could have been introduced prior to supposing
φ. In that case, c1 is already defined and will not necessarily be the result of
updating c0 with φ; rather, 0 : +φ will create some new state, say c2, and set it
equal to c0[φ]. So in this case, 1 : ∴ψ will not be testing the result of updating
c0 with φ, but instead some other suppositional state.
Intuitively, the following is a way of describing an argument by conditional
proof:
0 : + φ, 0+ : ∴ψ  0: ∴(φ→ ψ)
That is, we want the second label to be whatever is the next extension of 0
that has not yet been introduced in the discourse. The trouble is that we do
not know what that label is independent of a context. So “0+” does not denote
anything until we know what context we are looking at.
In order to describe inference patterns like conditional proof more fully, we
will define entailment as a relation between (what we will call) generic labeled
sentences. A generic label is either a specific label (i.e., a sequence of numbers)
or the result of adding some number of “+”s to a generic label. We might
define the generic labels recursively as follows.
Definition 24 (Generic Labels)
α ::= n | (α)+···+
Intuitively, (α)+···+ (with m-many +s) is the result of extending α with
the mth smallest k such that α.k has yet to be assigned an information state
by our context. Note that we can iterate the (·)+···+ operators to represent
nested supposition labels. To simplify notation, we will drop the parentheses
around the first application of this operation. So, for example, suppose c1 is
defined but not c2, c3, c4, . . . . Then, relative to c, 0
+ denotes 2, 0++ denotes
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3, etc. By contrast, relative to c, (0+)+ denotes 2.1, rather than 3. (Note: this
regiments more formally our earlier use of the same notation.)
With these generic labels, we can now more accurately represent inference
patterns that require introducing new suppositions. For example, conditional
proof can be represented as the following (where n is any label):19
n : + φ, . . . , n+ : ∴ψ  n : ∴(φ→ ψ)
As an application of generic labels with multiple +s, here is how we would
represent proof by cases:
n : φ ∨ ψ, n : + φ, . . . , n+ : ∴χ, n : + ψ, . . . , n++ : ∴χ  n : ∴χ
Now that we have a better way of representing inference patterns, we can
define entailment more precisely. Where c is some context and α is some generic
label, let αc — i.e., the label that α denotes relative to c — be calculated as
follows:




+ · · ·+
c = αc.km
where αc.km is the mth smallest extension of αc that has yet to be defined by c.
Then we can define, for instance, dynamic entailment as a relation between
generic labeled sentences as follows:
Definition 26 (Generically Labeled Dynamic Entailment) α1 : φ1, . . . , αk : φk d
β : ψ iff for all c, if c[(α1)c : φ1] · · · [(αk)c : φk]βc is defined, then:
c[(α1)c : φ1] · · · [(αk)c : φk][βc : ψ]βc = c[(α1)c : φ1] · · · [(αk)c : φk]βc .
Note that since every specific label is a generic label, this definition includes
the first pass definition we gave above but extends it to generic labels as well.
19An anonymous referee points out that, at least at this level of generality, there is a differ-
ence between our formulation of conditional proof and the way it is usually formulated, e.g., in a
Fitch-style natural deduction system. In the latter, the conclusion of a conditional proof involves
discharging the supposition introduced (“closing” the subproof). In our formulation, the suppo-
sitional state still “hangs around” and so, without further constraints, one could conceivably go
back to that suppositional state at a later point and continue reasoning from it. Our system allows
us to remain neutral as to whether discharging suppositions bars a speaker from returning to it
at a later point. On the other hand, even if one adopts our more general framework, one can still
explain why returning to those discharged assumptions is not permitted by appealing to certain
well-formedness constraints on discourses that are independently motivated (see page 22). In fact,
the right-frontier constraint from SDRT would rule out exiting a suppositional state and returning
to it later. So if we imposed that constraint, then there would be no material difference between
conditional proof as formulated here and as formulated in a Fitch-style proof system.
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While we take Generically Labeled Dynamic Entailment to provide a
suitable dynamic notion of entailment for discourses, it is unclear how to define
a corresponding static notion, even with generically labeled sentences. This
is because updating contexts on (generically) labeled sentences might require
introducing new suppositional states. But static entailment only checks that
the currently defined information state supports the sentence in question.
To illustrate, consider the following inference pattern:
0 : + p, 0+ : ∴q  0: ∴q
Intuitively, this is not a valid inference pattern in any sense: just because q is
true upon supposing p is true, that does not mean that q is (actually, categor-
ically) true. Yet, a static notion of entailment will have difficulties explaining
this. This is because 0+c is, by definition, not assigned any information state
by c, and so c0+c is undefined. Hence, trivially, if c[0
+ : ∴q]0+c = c0+c , then
c[0 : ∴q]0 = c0.
Our conclusion is that, in the presence of (generically) labeled sentences,
the notion of static entailment does not make much sense. We take the lesson
from this to be that there is an important difference between the validity of
inferences taken in the abstract (as sequences of sentences) and the validity
of inferences in discourse (as a sequence of (generically) labeled sentences or
arguments). This difference validates the intuitive distinction that philosophers
and cognitive scientists have independently made (Walton 1990, p. 411; van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, pp. 43–48; Pinto 2001, pp. 169–173; Stojnić
forthcoming) between inference as an abstract entity and that of argument as
essentially situated in discourse.
5 Extensions
5.1 Modal subordination
Modal subordination bears a close resemblance to suppositional arguments, so
it is natural to ask how it can be accommodated in our current framework.
Consider Roberts’s (1989) standard example:
(46) a. The wolf might come in. He will eat you.
b. Suppose a wolf comes in. He will eat you.
In (46a), we want to interpret the effect of the second sentence relative to
the possibility introduced by the first modal sentence that the wolf might
come in. Similarly, in (46b), the second sentence is interpreted relative to the
supposition that a wolf comes in.
Or consider a similar example, involving conditionals (Stojnić 2017, 2019):
(47) a. If a wolf comes in, we will use a gun. If we manage to shoot, we
will be safe. If we bury the body, nobody will find out.
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b. Suppose a wolf comes in. We will use a gun. Suppose we manage
to shoot. In that case, we will be safe. Suppose we bury the body.
In that case, nobody will find out.
In (47a), we want to interpret the effect of the second sentence relative to the
possibility introduced by the first modal sentence that the wolf might come
in. Similarly, in (47b), the second conditional has to be interpreted under the
scope of the possibility introduced by the antecedent of the first conditional —
the possibility that the wolf walks in. If this is correct, modal subordination
falls under the scope of a theory of suppositional arguments.
In order to capture modal subordination, we ought to refine our entry for
modals and conditionals. In particular, if we want to capture might-sentences
involvement in modal subordination, their update effect should not just be
that of testing the information state for whether it is compatible with their
prejacent. In addition, we should model their effect as that of adding a new
possibility updated with their prejacent (Willer 2013, 2015). For example, in
(46a), the first might-sentence should also introduce the possibility that the
wolf comes in, so that the second sentence can be interpreted relative to that
possibility. In our framework, that would amount to taking might-sentences to
introduce a new suppositional state.
Similarly, for (47a): here the first conditional does not just test the infor-
mation state for whether adding the antecedent supports the consequent and
then returns that original information state. Instead, we want the conditional
to also introduce a suppositional state updated with the antecedent, so that
the second conditional in (47b) can be interpreted under the scope of that
suppositional state. In our framework, that would amount to modeling the con-
ditional test in a way similar to how we have modeled the result of supposing
that a certain condition obtains and then testing it with ‘therefore’.
Since conditionals and might-sentences have a discourse level effect, similar
to the discourse level effect that our suppose operator + has, we want to cap-
ture the effect of their update at the discourse level. But because conditionals
and might-sentences can embed under Boolean connectives and modals, we
need to revise the update clauses slightly. Before we analyzed their semantics
as updating the information states, and then we had a clause for updating on
contexts that was unified for every labeled sentence that did not contain sup-
pose + and ∴ (cf. Section 3.2, Section 4.2). In order to capture the distinctive
discourse level effects of conditionals and modals, and in particular their modal
subordination effects, now it is convenient to recursively assign every sentence
of the language with an update effect on contexts, rather than separating out
their update effects on information state and their update effects on context.
So let us start with defining the semantics for Boolean sentences in terms
of context change potentials.
Definition 27 (Generalized Update for Booleans) Let c ⇑n s be the result of reas-
signing each k ∈ dom(c) such that k w n to the state ck∩s. That is, c ⇑n s percolates
the information contained in s up the tree from n. (Our earlier notation c ↑n φ is
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essentially the special case where c ⇑n cn[φ].)
c[n : p] = c ⇑n {w ∈ cn | w(p) = 1}
c[n : ¬φ] = c ⇑n (cn − c[n : φ]n)
c[n : φ ∧ ψ] = c[n : φ][n : ψ]
c[n : φ ∨ ψ] = c ⇑n (c[n : φ]n ∪ c[n : ψ]n)
In each case, these clauses capture the idea that we update a context with
a Boolean formula by performing the old update on the relevant information
state (and percolating that update up the tree). According to this definition,
an atomic sentence p’s effect on context is to replace the state with label n
with the set of p-possible worlds in that state. The effect of the negation ¬φ is
to replace the n-labeled state with the complement of the n-labeled state after
updating with φ. The effect of conjunction is to update the n-labeled state
sequentially with its conjuncts. And the effect of disjunction is to replace the
n-labeled state with the union of the updates with its disjuncts.
Now, let us turn to the modal sentences. The effect of the box is simply
that of testing the n-labeled state:
Definition 28 (Generalized Update for ‘Must’)
c[n : φ] =
{
c if c[n : φ]n = cn
c ⇑n ∅ otherwise
On the other hand, the effect of the diamond is not just a testing effect.
Rather, we want to capture its introducing a suppositional state (cf. Willer
2013). The following clause tells us that the effect of updating with n : ♦φ is
to test whether (essentially) cn leaves open φ, and, if so, then introduce a new
suppositional state above n that has not yet been defined (and if not, zero-out
cn and all states above). (Here, we interpret c ⊕n φ as the result of setting
cn+ = c[n : φ]n where n
+ is the first new extension of n.)
Definition 29 (Generalized Update for ‘Might’)
c[n : ♦φ] =
{
c⊕n φ if c[n : φ]n 6= ∅
c ⇑n ∅ otherwise
These entries for  and ♦ respect duality. More precisely, n : ♦φ is equiv-
alent to n : ¬¬φ, with the exception that ♦φ introduces a new suppositional
state updated with φ, whereas ¬¬φ does not. (The proof is left to the reader.)
This is a feature, not a bug, as it mimics the different anaphora-setting behav-
ior of the existential quantifier and the dual of the universal one. For instance,
while (48a) sounds fine, (48b) sounds odd.
(48) a. The wolf might come in. He will eat you.
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b. It is not the case that the wolf must not come in. ??He will eat
you.
Similarly, while (49a) sounds fine, (49b) sounds odd.
(49) a. A man came in. He had a drink.
b. It is not the case that nobody came in. ??He had a drink.
Next, consider the clause for the conditional.
Definition 30 (Generalized Update for the Conditional)
c[n : φ→ ψ] =
{
c⊕n φ if c[n : φ]n is defined and c[n : φ][n : ψ]n = c[n : φ]n
c ⇑n ∅ otherwise
Just like ♦, the conditional is a test. Whereas the ♦ tests for compatibility with
the information state,→ tests for support of the consequent by a suppositional
state which is introduced by the antecedent. It differs from other test semantics
for conditionals (Veltman 1985; Gillies 2009; Starr 2014a) in that if the test
is positive, it returns not just the original context prior to update with the
antecedent but the context with a new suppositional state updated with the
antecedent (though see Starr 2014b for a proposal similar to the one outlined
here, motivated by an analysis of Sobel sequences). This is crucial to our
account of modal subordination with conditionals.
In general, one conditional is modally subordinated to another if the former
has a label that was introduced by the latter.20 An important element of our
account is that which sentences are modally subordinated to which sentences
is represented by the labels: either the subordinated conditionals have the
same label or they have an incremental label. So in the following example,
the second is modally subordinated to the first, and, moreover, the third is
modally subordinated to the second:
n : A→ B,n+ : C → D, (n+)+ : E → F
20Our account of modal subordination significantly differs from Stojnić’s (2017) in that (1) we
adopt a test semantics for the conditional and (2) we situate the background information state as
part of a tree-like structure from the context. Notably, our account is able to address some of the
worries that Stojnić (2019, p. 405) raises for dynamic theories of content, specifically concerning
whether they are capable of modeling modal subordination for conditionals.
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if s[A][B] = s[A]
if s[A][C][D] = s[A][C]
if s[A][C][E][F ] = s[A][C][E]
In Section 4.4, we have seen how to formalize the (n+)+ notation. Con-
sistently with that formalization, we use (n+)+ for the label n.k.1, where
n.k = n+ is the label introduced by the first conditional (since n.k is new, the
first undefined proper extension of n.k is n.k.1). By contrast, in the following
example, the second and third conditionals are both modally subordinated to
the first, but the third conditional is not modally subordinated to the second
(meaning the second conditional’s antecedent has been discharged):




if s[A][B] = s[A]
if s[A][C][D] = s[A][C] if s[A][E][F ] = s[A][E]
Here, the fact that we are using the same label for both the second and
third conditionals indicates that they are both testing the suppositional state
introduced by the first, but the third conditional is not within the scope of
the second (for that interpretation, we would need to use (n+)+ for third
conditional’s label). For example, consider (50):
(50) If a wolf comes in, we will use a gun. If we manage to shoot we will
be safe. If we bury the body nobody will find out.
In (50), each conditional is modally subordinated to the previous one. So it
is like the first case above, where the third conditional has a label of the
form (n+)+. On the other hand, in (51), the final conditional is only modally
subordinated to the first one, but not to the second, on pain of inconsistency:
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(51) If a wolf comes in, we will use a gun. If we manage to shoot we will
be safe. If we do not manage to shoot it, we will be in trouble.
So this example is more like the second case, where the third conditional has
a label of the form n+.
Like with ♦,→ does not introduce a new suppositional state when embed-
ded under negation. (The proof is left to the reader.) This is to be expected,
as illustrated by (52):
(52) It is not the case that if a wolf walks in, we won’t use a tranquilizer
gun. ??If we managed to shoot it, we will be safe.
Finally, the clauses for ∴ and + are as they were before:
Definition 31 (Generalized Update for ‘Therefore’ and ‘Suppose’)
c[n : ∴φ] =
{
c[n : φ] if cn is defined and c[n : φ]n = cn
undefined otherwise
c[n : + φ] =
{
c⊕n φ if cn is defined
undefined otherwise
Except when φ is a conditional, a might-sentence, or a supposition, updat-
ing c with n : ∴φ will be redundant (i.e., return c) if it passes the test. Updating
with n : ∴(φ → ψ), n : ∴♦φ, or n : ∴ + φ is, in a sense, uninformative in that
cn will remain the same post-update (assuming c passes the test). But it will
not be a redundant update on the context in that it does have the effect of
changing the context by introducing new suppositional states.
5.2 Flavors of ‘therefore’
As we have seen in Section 3.1, ‘therefore’ can be used with different flavors:
not only logical/deductive but also causal flavor (e.g., (28a), (28b)) as well
as practical (e.g., (29)). It is natural to wonder how the dynamic account
developed in this paper can account for possibility of arguments with different
flavors.
To begin with, consider again (28b). To the extent to which this argument
sounds like a good one, it does seem to involve an unstated assumption — the
causal law that whenever a cigarette is dropped in a pile of hay, the hay will
catch fire. On this analysis, when used in causal arguments, ‘therefore’ is an
invitation to test that a state s supporting the causal laws C and augmented
with the premises supports the conclusion (i.e. to test that s[C][P1] · · · [Pn]
supports Q). This way of thinking of causal arguments enables us to model the
fact that, e.g., once an agent has learnt that whenever a cigarette is dropped
in a pile of hay, the hay will catch fire, they will be able to draw the conclusion
that ‘therefore’ this pile of hay caught fire, once they learn that in some specific
case a cigarette was dropped in a pile of hay. Similar considerations hold for
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arguments with practical flavor, such as (29). Here the unstated assumption
might be a moral or prudential law, or even a rule of etiquette.
So our analysis can easily accommodate both causal and practical argu-
ments.21 One might now wonder, however, about inductive or abductive
arguments. In such arguments we really do seem to jump to conclusions that
are not supported by our current information state, so in these cases one might
worry that our test semantics for ‘therefore’ cannot possibly work.
To begin with, notice, however, that often in inductive and abductive
arguments, we use ‘therefore’ with a qualified conclusion, as in (53a)–(53b):
(53) a. The sun has risen every day in the past. Therefore, it seems safe
to assume that it will rise again tomorrow.
b. The sun has risen every day in the past. Therefore, probably it
will rise again tomorrow.
Consider (53a). It is a good argument also because the conclusion that the sun
will rise again tomorrow is qualified by ‘it is safe to assume...’. Similarly for
(53b), where the qualification is done by the adverb ‘probably’. These inductive
arguments with qualified conclusions can be accommodated by our analysis,
just by adding further information or structure to our states. For example,
provided that the state is given probabilistic structure (as in Yalcin 2012), it
seems plausible that when augmented with the premises of (53b), the state
does support that it is probable that the sun will rise tomorrow, as in (53b).
The question now arises: Can ‘therefore’ ever be felicitously used in gen-
uinely inductive and abductive arguments without qualifications of sort? We
report that many speakers do endorse arguments such as (54a) and (54b) as
sound:
(54) a. Mark owns a Bentley. Therefore, he must be rich. (Krzyżanowska
et al 2013)
b. The sun has risen every day in the past. Therefore, the sun will
rise again tomorrow.
However, at closer look, it is not entirely clear that these conclusions are not
also qualified in the relevant sense. (54a) involves the modal ‘must’, that at
21There are different ways of implementing this general proposal. One is to think of these
arguments as enthymematic — as missing a premise (causal laws, moral laws, etc). A different
approach would be to treat ‘therefore’ as a modal like ‘must’ on a Kratzerian analysis (Kratzer
1977, 1981) and to extend this Kratzerian analysis to our dynamic framework. On a Kratzerian
analysis, different possible flavors of ‘must’ are modeled in a unified fashion by a function (the
‘modal base’) that takes a designated possible world into a set of propositions that varies depending
on the flavor of the modal: it can be the set of evidence available to one if the interpretation of the
modal is epistemic, or the set of deontic laws if the interpretation of the modal is deontic, and so
on. The same analysis can be extended to capture different flavors of ‘therefore’. We could import
this idea, proposed by Brasoveanu (2007, pp. 295–6), into our current framework but if we did, we
would need to make some adjustments to the proposal, since currently, in our semantic clauses for
‘therefore’ (Section 3.2, Section 4.2), there is no designated world that could be the input of the
modal base function. This could be obviated by taking ‘therefore’ to test the modal base for each
possible world in the relevant state. If the test fails for any world in the state, then the resulting
state is undefined. This different approach would have to augment the current formal framework
with an accessibility relation.
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least some think to be non-factive (Lassiter 2016; Del Pinal and Waldon 2019).
If ‘must’ is not factive, the conclusion in (54a) does not entail that Mark is rich,
but only that it is very likely given our evidence that Mark is rich (Del Pinal
2021). In that case, we can analyze the conclusion of (54a) in a way similar to
other probabilistically qualified conclusions.
Even the conclusion of (54b) may be said to be qualified by the use of
‘will’. For one, it is plausible that ‘will’ has “epistemic” uses, as illustrated in
(55) (cf. Condoravdi 2001; Condoravdi and Deo 2008; Khoo 2015; Cariani and
Santorio 2018).
(55) John will be in London by now.
In the case of future-oriented uses, it is hard to tell the epistemic and
non-epistemic readings apart, but the availability of epistemic readings for
sentences such as (55) at least calls into question whether the conclusion of
(54b) is really unqualified. Moreover, as Ninan (2021) observes, the use of ‘will’
is often licensed even in cases where the conclusion is only probabilistically
supported, as in (56).
(56) [Looking at the weather app, which says there’s a 99% chance of rain
tomorrow.] It will rain tomorrow.
So on plausible views of modals such as ‘must’ and ‘will’, in both (54a) and
(54b), the conclusion is not obviously “unqualified”.
We will not be able to settle here the thorny issue of whether ‘therefore’
can ever be used in inductive and abductive arguments with non-qualified
conclusions. For example, there is disagreement about whether the following
(not involving modals, or even tense particles in the conclusion) is felicitous
or not:
(57) ?Mark owns a Bentley. Therefore, he is rich.
We would like to conclude by mentioning a possible analysis of inductive argu-
ments which does predict that uses of ‘therefore’ in inductive arguments with
non-qualified conclusions are possible.
On this proposal inductive arguments are also treated as involving an
unstated assumption, as our earlier proposal for causal and practical argu-
ments. In the case of inductive arguments, however, the unstated assumption
is the so-called principle of uniformity of nature, or a specific form thereof.
The principle of uniformity of nature states that the course of nature contin-
ues uniformly the same, and in particular that the uniformity observed in the
past will hold for the present and future as well. An inductive argument might
be thought to be involving the unstated assumption that the course of nature,
in the respects specified by the premises, continues uniformly as the same. By
thinking of inductive arguments in this fashion, we allow for the possibility
that ‘therefore’ can be sometimes used in genuine inductive arguments with
Springer Nature 2021 LATEX template
The Dynamics of Argumentative Discourse 39
non-qualified conclusions, since in these arguments, ‘therefore’ would be test-
ing that the state with the premises and this unstated assumption support the
conclusion. For example, in (54b), the conclusion that the sun will rise again
tomorrow is supported by a state augmented with the premise that the sun
has risen every day in the past and the unstated assumption that the course
of nature continues uniformly as the same, with respect to sun rising.
This approach might put us in position to explain the distinctive failure of
monotonicity that we observe with inductive arguments. While our dynamic
notion of entailment is non-monotonic as we have seen (Section 3.3), its non-
monotonicity is isolated to arguments with epistemic modals in the conclusion:
arguments without epistemic modals in the conclusion are monotonic. By con-
trast, inductive arguments exhibit a distinctive kind of non-monotonocity that
does not involve epistemic modals (at least, assuming ‘will’ does not count as
a qualifier in the relevant sense). So for example, consider:
(58) a. [(54b)] The sun has risen every day in the past. Therefore, the
sun will rise again tomorrow.
b. The sun has risen every day in the past. And today is the end of
the world. ??Therefore, the sun will rise again tomorrow.
On the current analysis, (58a) is a good argument only on the unstated assump-
tion that the course of nature will continue as before in the respects specified
by the premises of (58a) (i.e., with respect to the sun rising). And even if (58a)
is a good argument, (58b) does not need to be a good argument, since a differ-
ent instance of the principle of uniformity of nature is invoked — viz., that the
course of nature will continue as before in the respects specified by the premises
of (58b) (which include the premise that today is the end of the world). And
from this principle, together with the premises of (58b), the conclusion that the
sun will rise again does not follow. Put differently: the principle of uniformity
of nature says the future will resemble/be similar to the past in the respects
specified by the premises. By including further premises in the argument, we
change the notion of similarity that is invoked by the unstated assumption.
To sum up, we outlined an analysis of causal and practical uses of ‘there-
fore’ that strikes us as promising. In inductive and abductive cases, it is less
clear that use of ‘therefore’ is licensed when the conclusions are not appro-
priately qualified. We have nonetheless sketched a possible analysis of uses
of ‘therefore’ in inductive arguments, that extends to account for distinctive
failures of monotonicity that are typical for inductive arguments.
6 Conclusions and outstanding issues
In this paper, we have provided a comprehensive semantics of arguments as
used in ordinary discourse. The framework that we have developed takes con-
texts to be more structured than usually understood in dynamic semantics.
Instead of them being information states, or information states with some
imbued structure, we proposed that the sort of context that is needed to model
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complex arguments, as well as suppositional arguments and the anaphoric
relations that those establish in discourse, ought to have a distinctive layered
structure. As we have shown along the way, this structure can be visualized as
a tree, whose branches model novel suppositions and whose nodes are infor-
mation states. Alternatively, we can represent these tree-like structures in a
linear fashion — e.g., as having something like the form of a Fitch proof. In
effect, our approach can be seen as a dynamic implementation of Fitch proofs
of this sort (but with additional flexibility in that one can temporarily exit
suppositional environments, as in parentheticals).
Interestingly, the structure of contexts that we uncovered turns out to be,
in some respects, a simplified application of the structure of contexts pro-
posed by SDRT (e.g., Kehler 2002; Asher and Lascarides 2003; Lascarides and
Asher 2007). In SDRT, labels are attached to discourse representation struc-
tures, discourse coherence relations, and Boolean combinations thereof. Our
framework turns out to be a “simplified” application of SDRT in that, unlike
regular SDRT, we did not build in discourse coherence relations into our mod-
els of contexts and we just focused on argumentative discourses. In some ways,
the similarities are unsurprising, since (as we saw in Section 2.1), argument
connectives exhibit distinctively anaphoric behavior. So, one would expect a
leading dynamic theory of anaphora to be applicable to such expressions. On
the other hand, as we mentioned in Section 2.1, there are a number of signif-
icant differences between pronominal anaphora and the kind of propositional
anaphora exhibited by ‘therefore’. And there has not been much discussion of
the anaphoric behavior of argument connectives within the literature on SDRT,
nor have their uses in proof-like discourses and complex arguments, such as
reductio and conditional proofs, been studied. Our theory in this paper demon-
strates that it is at least possible to apply an SDRT-like framework towards
this distinctive kind of anaphora, which in turn lends further support to the
fruitfulness of the framework. But more work is needed to determine how our
theory of argument connectives interacts with other parts of standard SDRT.
We will conclude by listing some notable questions for further investigation.
Anaphoric structure
Our analysis presupposes that discourses come to us with a settled anaphoric
structure and we are assuming that as semanticists, we can interpret discourses
as given to us with such a structure. This is analogous to the situation we find
ourselves in with pronominal anaphora: semanticists studying anaphora only
concern themselves with the semantics of sentences with anaphoric relations
built in, not with how exactly —i.e., through which mechanisms of relevance,
discourse resolutions, etc. — those anaphoric relations are determined in con-
text. While a sizable literature concerns how it is that a discourse comes to
have these anaphoric relations —i.e., what are the mechanisms of anaphora
resolutions (e.g., Sag and Hankamer 1984, Roberts 1998; Venditti et al 2002;
Stone and Lascarides 2010; Khalid et al 2020) — more work is there to be
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done on whether and how these mechanisms differ for pronominal anaphora
and for the sort of (propositional) anaphora that we observe with ‘therefore’.
Argument connectives and performatives
In Section 3.2.1, we have observed some similarities between ‘therefore’ and
performatives such as ‘I hereby conclude’. The analogy with performatives is
fitting, for using ‘therefore’ does amount to doing something —i.e., drawing
a conclusion. However, while ‘therefore’ does resemble performatives such as
‘I hereby conclude’ in some of its syntactic distribution, some differences are
striking. One difference is that they do not mean the same under third-person
attitude reports:
(59) a. Mary believes that Paolo is from Turin and, therefore, Italian.
b. ??Mary believes that Paolo is from Turin and, I conclude, Italian.
Another difference is that, as noted (footnote 8), the phenomenon of denegation
observed for performatives (Searle 1969; Hare 1970) does not seem to concern
also ‘therefore’. All in all, more work is needed to figure out the analogies and
disanalogies between ‘therefore’ and performatives.
Differences among argument connectives
In this paper, we have treated argument connectives such as ‘therefore’, ‘thus’,
‘then’, ‘so’, etc. in the same way, formalizing them all as ∴ (see Section 3.2.1).
While it is true that ‘therefore’, ‘hence’, and ‘thus’ exhibit similar behavior, the
cases of ‘then’ and ‘so’ are different, as they appear to have different distribu-
tion properties. While ‘then’ felicitously embeds under conditionals, ‘therefore’
does not (or at least, is less preferred), as illustrated in (60) (cf. Pavese 2017).
(60) a. If it is raining, then the streets are wet.
b. ?If it is raining, therefore the streets are wet.
By contrast, in categorical contexts, ‘therefore’ is preferred to ‘then’, as
illustrated in (61):
(61) It is raining.
a. Therefore, the street are wet.
b. ?Then the street are wet.
Next, consider ‘so’. When used as an argument connective, ‘so’ seems to be
more flexible in its distribution properties than ‘therefore’: the former can be
used in categorical or suppositional reasoning alike. Also, ‘so’ can be used
without linguistic antecedents, as in ‘So, you have arrived!’ and in this respect
seems to exhibit a deictic behavior. Moreover, while one cannot easily mix
‘therefore’, ‘thus’, or ‘hence’, one can use ‘so’ and ‘therefore’ together, as in:
(62) Mary is a progressive.
a. So, she therefore supports the Green New Deal.
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b. ≈ So therefore, she supports the Green New Deal.
A complete theory of the semantics of argument connectives ought to be sensi-
tive to these distributional differences. Another potential extension is a study
of the semantics of other argument connectives like ‘arguably’, ‘presumably’,
‘normally’, and so forth. On the one hand, these phrases seem to play a sim-
ilar role to ‘therefore’. On the other, they do not seem as strict in terms of
requiring that the conclusion strictly follows from the premises. These phrases
can also interact with ‘therefore’ and that deserves further investigation than
we are capable of providing here. Finally, the analogies between ‘therefore’
and causal connectives such as ‘since’ and ‘because’ — often emphasized by
discourse coherence theorists (cf. Hobbs 1985; Asher 1993; Bras et al 2001a,b,
2009; Kehler 2002; Asher and Lascarides 2003) — is worth a closer study than
we have provided here.
Arguments and justification
Given the connection of our framework to the Fitch proof system, it is natural
to wonder how one might represent the justifications of steps in a Fitch proof.
In a Fitch proof, one must cite introduction/elimination rules to justify each
step. In ordinary discourse, this can manifest with locutions like “by. . . ”, as in:
(63) It’s raining. Therefore, by disjunction introduction, it’s either raining
or snowing.
As it stands, our dynamic semantics does not test for the justification of an
inference; it only tests whether the conclusion is supported by the premises
given the context. One interesting area of future research is to explore ways of
including justifications within arguments. For this purpose, one possible route
is to introduce a kind of justification logic into a dynamic setting. Justifica-
tion logic is a variant of epistemic logic that introduces sentences paired with
a justification — so sentences have the form t : φ where t is a term for a jus-
tification (Artemov 1995; Fitting 2005; Artemov 2008; Artemov and Fitting
2019). Combining our dynamic framework with justification logic (Artemov
1995; Fitting 2005; Artemov 2008; Artemov and Fitting 2019) is a promising
way to model the effect of justification phrases like ‘by. . . ’.
Incorporating justifications into the current framework also has another
potential application. In this paper, we have not discussed zero-premise argu-
ments, that are quite central to natural logic systems as well as to mathematical
argumentative practices. Our omission is partly due to the fact we have focused
on arguments that are formulated with argument connectives, like ‘therefore’,
which as we have seen, require an antecedent (Section 2.1). That does not
mean, however, that zero-premise arguments cannot be made in ordinary dis-
course. We think it is plausible that an utterance of ‘Either it is raining or it
is not raining’ could, for example, be thought of as a zero-premise argument,
in which we assert the conclusion to hold “by logic”, so to say. This suggests
that zero-premise arguments can be modeled as cases where an assertion is
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given a special kind of justification offered by the entire logical system, rather
than by a specific rule (cf. Pavese (2021)).
Embeddings, subjunctive arguments, pragmatics
Further areas of further research encompass uses of ‘therefore’ under embed-
dings such as belief reports and epistemic modals (Section 2.2), as well as the
study of subjunctive arguments, which we have to leave out. Finally, while
we have primarily focused on the semantics of arguments, there is a lot of
interesting work to be done on the pragmatics of arguments. For example, one
outstanding question here is how arguments, as speech acts, differ from other
related speech acts such as explanations (cf. Pavese forthcoming). Another
question is what role relevance plays in assessing arguments — e.g., is rele-
vance to be captured by the semantics of argument connectives or is it best
captured by pragmatics?
A full theory of arguments will have to address these questions at some point.
Here, we have only provided a starting framework for addressing them, as well
as the motivations for thinking that they are worth asking.
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